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Abstract
The rise of  party-based Islamic charities has had a profound impact on the 
nature of  philanthropic activities in contemporary Indonesia, and stimulated 
a new debate over the issue of  the politics of  benevolent acts. Over the past 
few years, in line with the increase of  the influence of  the Islamic factor in 
Indonesian politics, there have been a number of  political parties which actively 
engaged with social welfare activities through the newly-established Islamic 
charitable organizations. The close ties between charitable organizations and 
political parties may lead to the new patterns of  Muslim social and political 
activism, and to the new forms of  political clientelism. This article analyzes the 
vibrant effort of  political parties in sponsoring the inception and operation of  
Islamic charitable organizations in the post New Order era, and investigates 
how political clientelism has been established through charity practices. This 
paper compares the roles of  charitable organizations set up by the nationalist 
and Islamist parties in formulating strategies to promote their political interest. 
Based on three political parties studied in this article, which are the Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS), Golkar Party, and the Indonesian Democratic Party of  
Struggle (PDI-P), this paper argues that the practice of  charity has become 
a popular way used by politicians to patronize their constituents, but at the 
same time, this practice has weakened the Muslim perspective of  development 
and social change.
1  The author would like to thank KITLV under the “Citizenship Project” for 
generous support. 
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[Munculnya lembaga-lembaga amal yang dikelola oleh partai politik 
berpengaruh luas terhadap aktifitas filantropi di Indonesia dan memicu 
perdebatan seputar politik-kedermawanan. Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, 
selaras dengan semakin meningkatnya pengaruh Islam dalam lanskap politik 
Indonesia, partai-partai politik juga berlomba-lomba untuk terlibat aktif  
dalam aktifitas filantropi dengan mendirikan lembaga amal. Ikatan kuat 
antara partai politik dan lembaga amal tersebut tentu berpotensi melahirkan 
pola aktivisme sosial-politik Islam dan bentuk baru clientisme-politik. 
Artikel ini akan mengulas upaya keras partai politik dalam mendirikan dan 
mengendalikan lembaga-lembaga amal pasca Orde Baru dan menjelaskan 
bagaimana clientisme dapat terbentuk melalui aktifitas amal. Artikel ini 
akan membandingkan peran lembaga-lembaga amal yang didirikan oleh partai 
politik nasionalis dan Islam dalam menyusun strategi untuk menyukseskan 
agenda politik mereka. Dengan menganalisis tiga partai politik, Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan/PDI-P, 
dan Golongan Karya/Golkar, penulis berargumen bahwa aktifitas amal 
semakin populer di kalangan politisi sebagai cara menarik simpati konstituen, 
tetapi pada saat yang sama, praktik tersebut semakin memperlemah cara 
pandang umat Islam mengenai pembangunan dan perubahan sosial.]
Keywords: political parties, patronage, clientelism, charities, and 
development 
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A. Introduction 
The politics of  charities has been of  the most emerging 
topics among observers in the past few decades. The unprecedented 
development of  Islamic charitable associations in the Muslim world after 
September 11 has attracted a lot of  attention in the scientific community 
and among policy makers. Islamic charities have been described not only 
as a Muslim collective altruistic behavior, but also as a way to achieve and 
promote Islamic political objective. Jonathan Benthall in his observation 
about the nature of  charities in the Muslim world notes that while “some 
Islamic charities…have unequivocally decided to specialise in relief  and 
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development only, others…have a mixed agenda.”2 In his work, Benthall 
refers to Saudi-based Islamic Relief  Organizations (IIRO), which is 
believed to have promoted Islamic dakwah (missionary activities) and 
“reislamization” in many parts of  the world, besides to have run relief  
and development projects. Islamic charities have also increasingly become 
‘political’ when they intersected a political structure, including the state 
law, government agencies, as well as political parties. 
The nature of  Islamic charities, like other non-religious charities, 
can also be seen from the characteristic of  the values utilized and 
promoted by charitable associations, as well as from the social, political 
and ideological backgrounds of  the volunteers, donors, and recipients. 
In the Muslim world, there have been a bunch of  examples of  how 
charity activism is driven by political interest, and how the interest groups 
attempted to achieve their political objective through non-political 
activities, such as social work and community services. In a number 
of  Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Malaysia and 
Indonesia, there are a number of  Islamist movements whose social-
welfare activities are heavily motivated by both religious and political 
agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood of  Egypt, the Hizbullah of  Lebanon 
and the Hamas in Palestinian Territories are among examples of  how 
the grassroots movements are active in charitable activities.3 
The Muslim Brotherhood has been of  the most influential Islamist 
political movements in the 21th century. It was founded by Hasan al-
Banna as a response to colonialism and political authoritarianism in 
Egypt.4 Since its inception in 1928, the Brotherhood has been known as 
a grassroots movement, and the proponents of  this movement were and 
have been very active in implanting Islamic spirituality and social practices 
among Muslim families. The advocates of  the Brotherhood used Islamic 
2  Jonathan Benthall, “Introduction: Faith based Organizations as Political, 
Humanitarian and Religious Actors,” Proceeding of  the Workshop on “Religion, Politics, Conflict, 
and Humanitarian Action, Geneva Switzerland, May 18-19, 2005, p. 4. 
3  See Rana Jawad, Social Welfare and Religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese Perspective 
(Bristol: the Policy Press, 2009); J. Miliard Burr and Roberts O. Collins, Alms for Jihad: 
Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
4  Hassan al-Banna, the founder of  the Muslim Brotherhood, and his 
contemporary attempted to reconcile Islamic political ideal and grassroots activism, and 
disseminated Islamic norms in the social and political spheres as a means of  achieving 
public welfare. 
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study circles (halaqah) to spread its mission among the Muslim middle class 
and university students. Thank to the Brotherhood’s active participation 
in organizing popular activities beneficial for the communities, such 
as providing means for Muslim families living in poverty and offering 
affordable education for low income households, the advocates of  the 
Brotherhood could achieve substantial support from a large part of  
Egyptian Muslims.5 The Brotherhood’s style of  activism which combined 
religious discourse and social activism has been widely adopted in many 
Muslim countries. Subsequent to the fall of  Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the 
Brotherhood movement launched the Freedom and Justice Party (Hizb 
al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala) as a new vehicle for Brotherhood’s politicians 
to participate in the Egyptian national politics. 
The transformation of  the Islamist movement into political 
parties, as experienced by the Brotherhood of  Egypt, can also be seen 
in the Hamas’ experience in Palestinian territories. Hamas is a fruit of  a 
long Palestinian political struggle for independence. It was established 
by Shaikh Ahmad Yassin, the prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader 
in Gaza. In its initial stage in the 1970s, Yassin established a charitable 
organization, al-Mujamma al-Islamiyya whose duties, at that juncture, 
were to support Palestinian needs of  public facilities, such as mosque, 
school, library, and orphanage. Hamas as an Islamist movement was 
first launched in the late 1980s as a response to the conflict between 
Palestinians and Israelis that killed a number of  Palestinian civilians. 
In subsequent years, Hamas increasingly witnessed a radicalization, 
partly evidenced by the inception of  Hamas’ military wing, named Izz 
al-Din al-Qassam Bridge in 1991. Since then, Hamas has been seen as 
the perpetrator of  many violent actions in the occupied territories and 
even labeled ‘terrorist’ by the Israelis and the West. Although Hamas 
has attracted widespread criticism from the West, it was and has been 
praised by Palestinians, especially those residing in Gaza, for its struggle 
for Palestinian independence. What is interesting is that Hamas has 
transformed into one of  the most important political factions in the 
Palestinian political history as it achieved a considerable victory in the 
5  Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2001), pp. 
487-510; Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 (2001), pp. 107-121. 
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2006 election over the Fatah, previously the largest Palestinian political 
faction. Hamas has received an extensive support from the public not 
only because of  its political struggle against Israelis, but also thank to its 
vigorous efforts to be directly involved in the community-based welfare 
activities.6 In sum, the social and political roles of  Hamas in Palestine 
and the barnstorming engagement of  Muslim Brotherhood with a 
wide-range of  social services in Egypt and Jordan7 indicate that the 
interplay between religion (Islam) and politics as well as the relationship 
between political parties and charitable associations have resulted in the 
dynamism of  Muslim social and political expression in public space. 
The abovementioned Islamist movements with their social concern are 
also comparable with the Hizbullah’s extensive social enterprises for 
the Muslim and Christian communities in Lebanon,8 and the popular 
social services of  Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. Both 
Hizbullah and AKP have gained strong support from the Lebanese and 
Turkish respectively. 
Such a brief  comparative discussion of  the proliferation and 
durability of  Islamic charities and the social movements in the Muslim 
world compelled me to explore the nature of  the politics of  charities in 
Indonesia by investigating the roles of  political parties in the inception 
of  Islamic charities in post New Order era. It appears that the growth 
of  Islamic charities in Indonesia as the world’s largest Muslim country 
cannot escape from the dynamism of  the national politics. In the past 
ten years, political parties have become very active in running charitable 
services, such as providing aid for the poor in urban areas and organizing 
relief  operations in disaster affected spots. The relationship between 
Islamic charities and political parties in post New Order Indonesia is 
interesting to investigate because there has been a vivid development in 
Indonesian politics which gives a considerable impact on the nature of  
6  See Matthew Levitt, HAMAS: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of  Jihad 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006). 
7  See Quintan Wictorowicz, The Management of  Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, Albany: State University of  New York Press, 2001; 
Harmsen Egbert, Islam, Civil Society and Social Work: Muslim Voluntary Welfare Associations in 
Jordan between Patronage and Empowerment (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008) 
8  Jopeh Elie Alagha, The Shift in Hizbullah’s Ideology: religious Ideology, Political ideology, 
and Political Program (Amsterdam & Leiden: ISIM and Amsterdam University Press, 2006).
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political patronage and clientelism. This article, in particular, examines 
the impact of  the bonds between Islamic charities and political parties 
on the nature of  Islamic social activism; explores the reason behind the 
utilization of  religious (Islamic) idioms by political parties in underpinning 
their charitable services; as well as analyzes the types of  patron-client 
relationships between politicians and their party-based charitable 
associations.
B. Party Politics, Islamism, and Welfare Issues 
In identifying the social characteristic of  Indonesian Islam, 
Robert W. Hefner highlights the presence of  Muslim social welfare 
organizations and Islamic educational institutions. The extensive roles 
played by Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama in organizing social 
welfare activities and education has shaped the patterns of  what Hefner 
calls “Muslim social imaginary” in Indonesia. Under the concept of  
“social imaginary,” Islam is associated not just “with individual piety 
or grand schemes for capturing the state, but also with the practical 
goals of  educating people, treating the sick and, in short, making social 
institutions more ethical and effective.”9 In other words, Hefner notes 
that Indonesian Muslims, through their associations, have learned how 
“to link the practice of  their faith not just to micro-social devotion or 
macro-level state politics but to the middle-range ‘civic’ activities of  
education and social welfare.”10 Unfortunately, Hefner does not pay a 
particular attention to rise of  Islamic charities in Indonesia that may give 
us a new picture of  the Indonesian Muslim social and political imaginary.
As noted previously, Indonesia has undergone a considerable 
increase of  Islamic charities, partly marked by the rise of  both state-
sponsored and community-based zakat collectors. According to the 
2011 Zakat Law, there are two types of  zakat collectors in Indonesia: the 
first is the state-sponsored zakat collector (BAZNAS), and the second is 
the community-based zakat collector (LAZ). These two types of  zakat 
collectors are operated by different actors, and, practically, they have 
9  Robert W. Hefner, “Indonesia in the Global Scheme of  Islamic Things: 
Sustaining of  the Virtuous Circle of  Education, Associations and Democracy,” in 
Jajat Burhanuddin and Kees van Dijk (eds.), Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and 
Interpretations(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), pp. 54-55. 
10  Robert W. Hefner, “Indonesia in the Global Scheme of  Islamic Things,” p. 55. 
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often competed for the zakat resources in both communities and private 
companies. Estimated in some reports, the numbers of  temporary zakat 
collectors in present-day Indonesia are more than 700.000 units; while 
the semi-permanent zakat agencies are about 100.000 units.11 Beyond the 
roles of  both state and community-sponsored zakat collectors, political 
parties seem to have been interested in running charitable foundations 
and at the same time in managing zakat agencies. 
The close ties between civil society organizations, including Islamic 
charities, and political parties in Indonesia’s social and political landscape 
is rather complex. This is because, historically speaking, a number of  
political parties in post New Order era were established by the proponents 
of  the Islamic civil society movements. As the social and political analysts 
have noted, in post New Order era, a large number of  the former 
advocates of  civil society organizations emerged as main “beneficiaries 
of  Indonesia’s democracy”12 by becoming a new “political class”. Those 
activists decided to run for a political position in the bureaucracy.13 
Unsurprisingly, the widespread civil society networks transformed into 
new political networks,14 and, therefore, the “re-engagement” of  NGOs 
and Islamic charities with political parties becomes increasingly prevalent.15
The 1999 General Election apparently provided wider opportunities 
for social activists and intellectuals with Islamic background to engage 
with political parties. Muslim leading personalities, who in Soeharto 
era became the advocates of  civil society, ran for national politics. For 
example, Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), two largest 
Islamic civil society organizations in Indonesia, were very instrumental 
in the inception of  new political parties. In the past, in response to the 
political dynamics in the first decade of  Indonesian Independence, 
11  “Religious Practices: Zakat (Almsgiving): Indonesia,” in Suad Joseph (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of  Women & Islamic Cultures, Brill Online, 2013. 
12  Vedi R. Hadiz, “Democracy and Money Politics: the Case of  Indonesia,” in 
Richard Robinson (ed.), Routledge Handbook of  Southeast Asian Politics (Oxon: Routledge, 
2012), p. 73. 
13  Gerry van Klinken & Joshua Barker (eds.), State of  Authority: the State in Society 
in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2009). 
14  Jacqueline Vel, “Reading Politics from a Book of  Donation: the Moral 
Economy of  the Political Class in Sumba,” in Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker (eds.) 
State of  Authority: the State in Society in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2009), p. 139.
15  Edward Aspinall and Meredith L. Weiss, “The Limit of  Civil Society,” p. 214. 
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both Muhammadiyah and NU began to be involved in the politics.16 
Muhammadiyah as the modernist movement affiliated with the Masyumi 
Party, the largest Islamic party in the 1950s-1960s, which was led by a 
prominent Muslim politician, Mohammad Natsir. The Nahdlatul Ulama 
also supported the Masyumi, but later decided to form a separate political 
party from Masyumi. Both Masyumi and the Nahdlatul Ulama gained 
considerable votes and were listed in ‘the big three’ political parties in the 
1955 Election. Unsurprisingly, some leading figures from the modernist 
and traditionalist Muslim circles became top-ranking government officers. 
After facing a great deals of  political difficulties in Soeharto era in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, Muhammadiyah and NU officially began to 
detach from political parties, despite the fact that a number of  activists 
of  these two organizations were still active in political parties by joining 
The United Development Party (PPP), the only Islamic party in New 
Orde era,17 or affiliating to Golkar, the New Order’s political machine.
As soon as Soeharto step down from his power, the former 
President of  Muhammadiyah, M. Amien Rais founded the National 
Mandate Party (PAN); while Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the former 
Chairman of  NU, created the National Awakening Party (PKB). In the 
same way, using parties as political vehicles also became the interest of  
other Muslim groups such as the Tarbiyah movement. The advocates of  
the Tarbiyah movement whose political ideology is inspired by the Muslim 
Brotherhood of  Egypt set up the Justice Party (PK, recently known as 
the Prosperous Justice Party or PKS). Likewise, the former supporters 
of  the Masyumi Party attempted to reinvent the Masyumi-like party. 
Their political energy, however, should be channeled to different political 
16  See for further discussion, Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogy of  Islamic 
Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia,” South East Asia Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2002), 
pp. 117-154; Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2009); “The Masyumi Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and 
Political Exigency,” Studia Islamika, Vol. 12, No. 1, (2005), pp. 75-99; Rémy Madinier 
and Andrée Feillard, “At the Source of  Indonesian Political Islam’s Failure: the Split 
between the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Masyumi in Retrospect,” Studia Islamika, Vol. 6 
No. 2 (1999), pp. 1-38.
17  The New Order government fused political parties into three: Islamic parties 
were fused into PPP, while nationalist parties into PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). 
These two parties should compete with New Order sponsored quasi-party, Golkar 
(Golongan Karya). 
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streams. There were at least three parties claiming as the successor of  
the Masyumi: Partai Masyumi Baru, Partai Politik Islam Indonesia (PPII) 
Masyumi, and PBB-Partai Bulan Bintang (the Crescent Star Party). It 
appears that, in the 1999 and 2004, PBB which was chaired by Yusril 
Ihza Mahendra gained more votes than the first two parties. This political 
development among Indonesian Muslims in post New Orde era suggests 
that the involvement of  civil society organizations in the national politics, 
has shaped not only the future trajectory of  political Islam,18 but also 
has formed the current types of  ideologically and politically-driven social 
activism among Indonesian Muslims.
The path of  Muslim NGO activists with the modernist and 
traditionalist backgrounds in gaining political power is comparable. 
Muslim activists among the modernist circle such as Adi Sasono, Dawam 
Rahardjo, Emil Salim and others played profound roles in fostering the 
Muslim NGO sector. In the 1970s, they took the initiative to set up 
LP3ES, a development and research NGO which specifically focuses 
on economics and social development projects. Other Muslim activists 
from the modernist group, such as A. M. Saefuddin and M. Amin 
Azis, both are professors at Bogor Institute of  Agriculture (IPB), were 
involved in the NGO sector with special programs on agricultural and 
small-medium economic enterprises. The abovementioned personalities 
played a considerable part in the early 1990s when the Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI) was founded. As the New Order-
sponsored organization, ICMI had stimulated Muslim activists from 
the modernist circle to activate their networks and to accelerate Muslim 
vertical mobilization.19 The result was that some ICMI members, such as 
Adi Sasono and A.M. Saefuddin were appointed in the Habibie’s cabinet.20 
It appears that Muslim traditionalists also underwent a similar 
18  See Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004); 
Anis Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory,” 
Asian Survey, vol. 44. No. 5 (2004), pp. 669-690.
19  Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for 
the Indonesian Middle Class,” Indonesia (Ithaca), No. 56 (1993), 1-35; Civil Islam: Muslim 
and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton University Press, 2000). 
20  Then, Adi Sasono erected Partai Merdeka (the Party of  Independence) in 2003; 
A. M. Saefuddin who intended to run for Presidency joined PPP; while M. Amin Azis 
who is now has been active in an NGO specifically working on business incubation 
was the co-founder of  Partai Amanat Nasional. 
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path to the modernists. In the 1980s Gus Dur, who then enjoyed three 
terms of  chairmanship of  the Nahdlatul Ulama since 1984 until the late 
1999, was of  the most important personalities inspiring younger Muslim 
activists within the traditionalist circle to disengage from the terrain 
of  political and state bureaucratic activities. Gus Dur also became the 
mentor of  many grassroots-based initiatives and forged an alliance with 
other pressure groups against the authoritarian regime.21 The interests of  
Muslim NGOs ranged widely, from fostering political reform to creating 
a just society. There were concerned with such issues as civil society, 
democracy, gender justice, and poverty eradication. Although Muslim 
NGOs among the traditionalist circle, which prevailed throughout the 
regions, especially in Java, could survive, they should also face a new 
challenge and chance, as a result of  the shift in the political atmosphere 
following the appointment of  Gus Dur as the President of  the Republic 
of  Indonesia. Some young NU activists accelerated vertical mobilizations: 
some were appointed as ministers in the Gus Dur’s state cabinet. To sum 
up, NU’s activists transformed from the grassroots movements into a 
new ‘political class’. 
The transformation of  the Islamic movements (informal structure) 
into a political party (formal structure) has also become part of  the 
contemporary history of  the Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia. Since 
the 1980s, the Indonesian branch of  the Brotherhood movement has 
attracted a large number of  Muslim student activists.22 In the 1980s and 
1990s, the Tarbiyah movement had played an important role in promoting 
the notions of  social justice, welfare, and the Islamic state. Despite the 
fact that Muslim student activists showed different tones in conceiving 
the Brotherhood political ideas, the Tarbiyah movement confidently 
transformed into a dominant Muslim student movement in the last years 
of  the New Order era.23 In the 1980s and 1990s, the proponents of  this 
21  Gus Dur actively criticized Soeharto administration for failing to overcome 
injustice in Kedung Ombo case, World Bank-funded Dam project case, which eradicated 
many villages while the displaced families did not receive appropriate compensation.
22  See Hilman Latief, “Youth, Mosques, and Islamic Activism: Islamic Source 
Books in University-based Halaqah,” Kultur: the Indonesian Journal for Muslim Culture, Vol. 
5, No. 1 (2010), pp. 63-88. 
23  Some of  the halaqah activists, through their student organization, the United 
Indonesian Muslim Student Action (KAMMI-Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia), 
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movement were concerned with a variety of  international political affairs, 
such as conflicts in the Middle East (Palestine-Israel), Balkan (Bosnia-
Serbia) and the like. In 1998, the Tarbiyah movement transformed into 
a new vibrant Islamist political party named Justice Party. Due to its 
failure in passing electoral thresholds in the 1999 election, the party was 
renamed Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).24 
It is worth emphasizing that Muslim political activism can be 
seen not only within the newly-established parties after the fall of  New 
Order era. Instead, there are a number of  Muslim activists who decided 
to channel their political energy and career through the long-established 
secular-nationalist parties such as Golkar and PDI-P. Ever since, Islam 
has increasingly become a determinant factor in Indonesian politics, and 
consequently, the polarization of  Indonesian politics into Islamic parties 
and secular-nationalist parties cannot clearly be seen in contemporary 
Indonesian politics, to compare with what happened in the past.25 The 
penetration of  Muslim politicians in the secular-nationalist party is 
fruitful. In fact, the ‘Islamic factor’ seems to have been influential in 
the Indonesian politics today, rousing secular-nationalist parties to use 
‘Islamic expression’ in their political discourse. However, the increase 
of  ‘Islamic factor’ in Indonesia is not necessarily in concert with the 
increase in numbers of  votes for Islamic parties. The Islamic factor does 
not mean that Islamic parties can easily mobilize Muslim voters. For 
more than half  of  the century since the first election was held in 1955, 
Islamic parties have always been shadowed by secular-nationalist parties 
in terms of  gaining Muslim votes. Islamic aspiration in the parliament 
never becomes dominant, mainly because Muslim political orientation 
in Indonesia is highly fragmented.26
in fact had an opportunity to gain victories in the student presidential elections held in 
private or state-sponsored universities. 
24  See Yon Machmudi, “Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of  Jemaah Tarbiyah 
and the Prosperous Justice Party,” Ph.D Thesis, Australian National University, 2006. 
25  In analyzing political streams in Indonesia, observers mainly used Geerzt’s 
concepts of  santri (devout or practicing Muslims), priyayi (the nobles of  the Robe), and 
abangan (nominal Muslim who adhere to Javanese norms instead of  Islamic religion). 
Islamic parties represented the political aspiration of  santri, while secular-nationalist 
parties represented the aspiration of  abangan.
26  There are Islamist groups struggling to create an Islamic state, to change the 
Indonesian state philosophy with Islam, or reinvigorate the spirit of  the Jakarta Charter 
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C. The Inception of  Party-based Islamic Charities 
Now, we turn to our discussion about the rise of  political party-
based charities and how Islamic idioms are utilized by political parties in 
their dealing the notions of  welfare. First of  all, I would like to draw my 
attention to the role of  the Islamist party, PKS, in projecting its politically-
driven social imaginary through charitable foundations. PKS has played 
essential roles in the formation of  Islamic charities working on relief  and 
development projects. PKS with its young supporters has tried to associate 
themselves with “the everyday life” of  Indonesians via Islamic charities, 
just like the Brotherhood’s strategy to be “socially well-connected to 
societies”.27 The establishment of  autonomous organizations by PKS 
is of  the most interesting parts of  PKS social and political activism in 
terms of  establishing networks between Islamic charities, political parties 
and government agencies. Kikue Hamayotsu in her evaluation on the rise 
of  PKS notes that the “strategic collation” between PKS and Islamic 
charities means a lot in order to expand “grassroots connection” by, at 
the same time, “depoliticizing” PKS social activities.28
Of  the most prominent PKS social wing is PKPU Foundation 
(Yayasan Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat). PKPU was a social division of  
PKS, but since 2001, it has become an autonomous relief  organization 
with its own legal umbrella. Recently PKPU has transformed into a 
well-organized and professional relief  organization in Indonesia. In 
order to finance its activities, PKPU has made various attempts, ranging 
from activating public fundraising to establishing a partnership with 
government agencies and private companies. PKPU has functioned as a 
zakat collector under the recognition of  the Ministry of  Religious Affairs 
but at the same time PKPU is a registered charity under the auspices 
according to which all Indonesian Muslims are urged to practice Islamic shari’a. But 
they never succeeded partly because Muslim political views are heavily fragmented, See 
Effendy, Islam and the State, pp. 216-217. But now, another form of  Islamization of  the 
government administration has taken place in line with the very liberal decentralization 
policy where local government in many provinces are able to issue Islam-inspired public 
policies, which are referred to as Shari’a by law. 
27  Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory,” p. 492. 
28  Kikue Hamayotsu, “The Political Rise of  the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-
Authoritarian Indonesia: Examining the Political Economy of  Islamist Mobilization in 
a Muslim Democracy,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 5, (2011), p. 983. 
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of  the Ministry of  Social Affairs.29 The ability of  PKPU to affiliate to 
two different Ministerial offices (the Ministry of  Social Affairs and the 
Ministry Social Affairs) cannot be detached from the role of  the chairman 
of  PKPU at that time, Suryama M. Sastra, who is also a member of  the 
Representative Council from PKS (2004-2009), and from the PKPU’s 
member of  Board of  Trustees, Salim Segaf  Al-Jufri, who in the President 
of  Yudoyono’s cabinet, is appointed as the Minister of  Social Affairs. 
Islamic charities which are linked to PKS, such as the Zakat House 
(Rumah Zakat), the Indonesian Red Crescent Society (BSMI) function 
as a way “to forge a link between the party elites and the masses”30 as 
well as “to strengthen image as a party active in humanitarian and relief  
operations.31 With strong political networks, PKS, through another ‘social 
wing’ organization, name the National Committee for Palestinian People 
(KNRP), has been active in the national and international arena.32 KNRP 
specifically deals with political issues taking place in Palestine, and aims to 
support any Palestinian effort to free from Israelis occupation. With other 
Islamic relief  organizations in Indonesia, KNRP actively organized mass 
demonstration, raised funds, and delivered aid to Palestine by engaging 
PKS networks in Egypt.33 
It should be noted that the proliferation of  political party-
sponsored Islamic charities have had wide-ranging impact, both negatively 
and positively, on the accountability of  parties in the public eyes. This 
is partly because the party system in Indonesia, like observer have 
noted, are vulnerable to any illicit activities. The party system in New 
29  Gaining two different organizational status from two ministerial offices (The 
Ministry of  Religious Affairs and the Ministry of  Social Affairs) enabled PKPU to 
have double or even multiple functions; as a zakat collector whose task is to mobilize 
Islamic charity funds, and as a social organizations which make it possible to access 
government development and social programs. 
30  Kikue Hamayotsu, “The Political Rise of  the Prosperous Justice Party,” 981. 
31  Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da’wa Mobilization 
among Youth: The Prosperous Justcie Party (PKS) in Indonesia,” RSIS Working paper, 
Singapore, 2009, p. 18. 
32  Hilman Latief, “Islamic Charities and Social Activism: Wlefare, Dakwah and 
Politics in Indonesia,” Ph.D Dissertation, Utrecht University, 2012, pp. 263-295. 
33  KNRP is led by Suripto, the former agent of  the State Intelligence 
Coordination Board Indonesian (BAKIN-Badan Kordinasi Intelejen Negara) who 
became a parliament member representing PKS in 2004-2009. 
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Order and Reformasi eras enabled parties and government officials to 
cooperate and establish ‘patronage coalition’ in terms of  gaining financial 
resources from the state’s budget. Marcus Mietzer’s observation about 
“financial patronage” in the Indonesian political system suggests that 
the growing ties between political parties and government offices have 
resulted in “the commercialization of  party politics”. Party representatives 
in the parliament and government offices have to finance the party’s 
expenditures by contributing about 40% of  their salaries or by channeling 
government projects in certain ministerial offices to party cadres. This 
type of  fundraising mechanism of  “financial patronage” through political 
parties and government agencies has become increasingly popular in 
Reformasi Era.34 Mietzer also notes that the weakness of  party in gaining 
public-fund forced politicians “to raise money by selling key positions in 
local government to external power brokers.”35 While Mietzer’ analysis is 
praiseworthy to examine some kinds of  ‘illicit’ fund-raising organized by 
politicians to finance parties, this paper would further explore the rise of  
autonomous organizations which function as ‘social wings’ of  political 
parties, and how the financial patronage operates in the networks between 
parties and charities. 
In the early 2013, Indonesian political arena was shocked by bribes 
scandal involving the President of  PKS, Lutfi Hasan Ishaq (LHI). He 
was detained by KPK as he was the prime suspect in the case of  beef  
importation. During the course in trial, he was accused of  playing a key 
role in driving the Ministry of  Agriculture to facilitate a local importing 
company additional beef  import quotas. Allegation that LHI received 
bribe money from the importing company has caused scandal. In the 
court, the director of  the Import Company (PT Indoguna Utama) 
admitted that that she already donated Rp 300 millions for PKS Dakwah 
34  This is partly marked with the engagement of  entrepreneurs, and also former 
military generals, in politics. Some major parties were and have been led by major 
entrepreneurs, such as Jusuf  Kalla and Abu Rizal Bakrie from Golkar, and Sutrisno 
Bachir and Hatta Rajasa from PAN. Surya Paloh, the former Golkar politician, is now 
chairing National Demokrat (NASDEM), and Harry Tanoe, a Chinese entrepreneur, 
is also now in charge as a top-leader in HANURA (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat) with 
the former Indonesian Army Commander, General Wiranto. 
35  Marcus Mietzer, “Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats: Illicit fund-raising in 
Contemporary Indonesia,” Southeast Asia Research, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2010), p. 243. 
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Tour (Safari Dakwah).36 It was also reported that PKPU and Rumah Zakat 
gained privileges to import beef  from Australia from 2010 until 2013. 
PKPU and Rumah Zakat have organized the distribution of  Qurban meat 
for the poor by importing the meat from Australia. PKPU as a ‘social’ 
organization received license from the Ministry of  Agriculture, Sarwono 
(PKS member) to import beef, but then the Directorate of  Customs and 
Excise (Direktorat Jenderal Bea dan Cukai), the Ministry of  Finance, 
found that the license expired. In other cases, Islamic charities became 
the ‘political machines’ during the election of  the local governors and 
mayors in certain regions by approving and disapproving candidacies of  
politicians to run for government offices. In the 2008 Mayor election in 
Bandung, West Java, PKS proposed Taufikurrahman (a lecturer at ITB, 
Bandung Institute of  Technology) and Dedi Triesnandi, familiarly known 
as ‘Abu Syauqi’ (the founder of  Rumah Zakat) as the PKS candidate.37 
Ever since, public impression of  the Rumah Zakat’s political orientation 
increase and people started questioning whether Rumah Zakat is a 
politically autonomous zakat agency or only an arm of  a political party.38 
In the same way, Golkar Party has been interested in governing 
Islamic charities. Since its inception in the 1960s, Golkar has been rather 
accommodative to Islamic aspiration despite its predatory political 
activism. The uniqueness of  Golkar can be seen in its “friendly” attitudes 
toward Islamic aspiration and its consistency in acting as a guardian of  
the state ideology, Pancasila.39 Golkar has been labeled a ‘secular-inclusive 
36  Surprisingly, the Director of  Import company (PT Indoguna Utama), admitted 
in the court that she already donated Rp. 300 millions for PKS Dakwah Tour (Safari 
Dakwah). 
37  Kikue Hamayotsu, “The Political Rise of  the Prosperous Justice Party,” 984; 
Hilman Latief, ‘Health Provision for the Poor: Islamic Aid and the Rise of  Charitable 
Clinics in Indonesia’, South East Asia Research, 18 (3), pp. 503-225; also Hilman Latief  
“Islam and Humanitarian Affairs: the Middle Class and New Patterns of  Social 
Activism,” in Kees van Dijk and Jajat Burhanuddin (eds.), Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting 
Images and Interpretations (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), pp. 173-194. 
38  The head of  PKS of  Bandung region also admitted that although there is not 
official relation between PKS and Rumah Zakat, many PKS sympathizers were active 
to support Rumah Zakat, and vise versa, Rumah Zakat is also supportive of  PKS in 
conduction social and charitable activities. 
39  Dirt Tomsa, Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the Post New 
Order era (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 13. 
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party’ by observers, to distinguish it from another secular-nationalist 
party such as PDI-P which was labeled a ‘secular-exclusive party’.40 
Unlike Golkar which shows “respective response to Muslim aspiration,” 
PDI-P seems to strictly “exclude any-Islamic-inspired agenda”.41 With 
a long historical experience in mass mobilization,42 Golkar is a skilful in 
capitalizing its networks in the government bureaucracies and in building 
coalition with Islamic institutions.43 In the past two decades, the Islamic 
section in Golkar has enabled Golkar to reinforce informal coalition 
with Islamic constituents as well as to include Islamic aspiration in their 
political discourse. Although in post New Order era Golkar can no 
longer function as an effective political machine of  the bureaucracy, it still 
played a vital role in maintaining its political appeal. In fact, Golkar was 
still solid and included in the big three parties in the past three elections 
(1999, 2004, and 2009).44 
Many Golkar functionaries were also the members of  ICMI. This 
symbolizes the close ties between Golkar and ‘Islam’. It can be argued 
that political patronage was constructed by Golkar through the Islamic 
section. In Soeharto period, there were a number of  Muslim politicians 
who used ICMI as an “elite lobby” in the State administration.45 As 
the New Order’s political machine, Golkar was supported by the 
40  Anis Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia,” p. 672. 
41  Ibid., p. 673.
42  Historically, GOLKAR originates from the ‘fusion’ of  a number of  people 
organizations with strong support from military and Soeharto, such as Kosgoro, 
MKGR, SOKSI, and Ormas Hankam. These organizations emerged as the anti-
communist movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Unsurprisingly, in the past a number 
of  military figures were appointed as top-ranking leaders in these organizations and 
in the GOLKAR as well. 
43  Yusup, Muhammad. Sofia, Adib & Asroni, Ahmad. 2011. “Islam dan Partai 
Politik: Studi Komparatif  terhadap Organisasi-organisasi Islam Sayap Partai Politik 
PDI-P dan GOLKAR di Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta,” Jurnal Penelitian dan Pengembangan 
Ilmu-ilmu Agama, Vol. xx, No. 1, pp. 1-21. 
44  At that time Golkar was chaired by Akbar Tanjung, the a former President of  
Islamic Student Association (HMI) in the late 1970s. As a new Muslim influential patron 
in Golkar, Akbar Tanjung was successful in recruiting significant numbers of  former 
Muslim activists of  HMI to become Golkar politicians. The Islamic section in Golkar 
mainly constitutes the modernist groups, such as HMI and Muhammadiyah, but then, 
the party also included people from the traditionalist Muslim circles.. 
45  Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 140 
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government bureaucracy and state’s funds to run its political campaign. 
In New Order era, Golkar popularized its Islam-based activities for 
political mobilization. For example, during the Ramadan month, Golkar 
functionaries and elites were active to visit their cadres and constituents in 
many regions throughout Indonesia by organizing politically-embedded 
tour, which is referred to as “Safari Ramadan” (Ramadan Tour).46 Apart 
from organizing social and charitable activities such as the distribution 
of  assistance to pesantren (Islamic schools) and mosques, this tour also 
functioned as a way to mobilize mass. 
Concomitant with the growing trend among Indonesian Muslims 
to run zakat collectors, Golkar took initiative to set up its own zakat 
collector to which Golkar functionaries and elites channel their zakat 
and charity funds. The establishment of  GOZIS (Gerakan Orang untuk 
Zakat, Infak dan Sedekah-People’s Movement for Charity) indicates the 
complexity of  zakat organizing in Indonesia. GOZIS was established 
in 2011 and initiated by Hajriyanto Y. Tohari, the former Chairman of  
Muhammadiyah Youth Movement. Through this newly-established 
institution, Golkar’s social and religious activities, such as Safari 
Ramadhan, religious study groups (pengajian) and distribution of  aid can 
be organized in a more systematic way. This is partly because GOZIS 
has appointed a number of  volunteers who are able to directly interact 
and work with the communities.47 
The presence of  GOZIS with its religious and social activities 
seems to have complemented other Golkar’s autonomous organizations 
with Islamic orientation, such as MDI/Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah 
(Islamic Dakwah Board), and SKUI/Satuan Karya Ulama Indonesia 
(Golkar Islamic Scholars Union).48 The inception of  MDI and SKUI in 
the 1970s also indicates Golkar’s active effort to strengthen its political 
46  Harmoko served President Soeharto as the Ministry of  Information from 1983 
until 1997. Afterwards he was elected as Chairman of  People’s Representative Council. 
Reports from the Ministry of  Information on Safari Ramadan, from 1984 until 1994, 
clearly show that political elites in Golkar used bureaucracies, such as certain Ministerial 
offices and bureaucracy in provincial and district levels, to facilitate their activities. 
47  Buletin Gozis, at http://www.scribd.com/doc/95265892/GOZIS and http://
www.golkarjateng.com/kabar-nusantara/612-lembaga-zakat-golkar-kembangkan-bmt 
48  Satuan Karya or Satkar Ulama Indonesia was founded by Soeharto and Golkar’s 
autonomous organizations such as AMPI (Angkatan Pembaharuan Muda Indonesia) 
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appeal for Muslim constituents. The MDI is led by a parliament member 
from Golkar; while SKUI was chaired by the late Tubagus Hasan Shohib, 
a charismatic figure from Banten who is also seen as the founder of  a 
political dynasty in Banten Province. Beside this, recently Golkar has 
founded Pengajian Al-Hidayah (women Islamic study group) to facilitate 
women Muslim Golkar activists and sympathizers to carry out religious 
and social activities. Al-Hidayah is headed by a senior figure of  the Fatayat 
NU, Aisyah Hamid Baidlowi, who is also the daughter of  Wahid Hasyim.49 
The appointment of  Aisyah as the chairperson of  Al-Hidayah can be 
seen as Golkar’s endeavor to gain support from the traditionalist Muslims. 
The establishment of  GOZIS is a fruit of  the modernist effort to 
give a new color of  Golkar’s Islamic nuances. This is partly evidenced by 
the fact that GOZIS volunteers are mainly former Muslim activists with 
modernist background. The modernist Islamic movement has a very rich 
experience in operating social welfare activities. In expressing its “social 
concern” to get closer with constituents in the grassroots, GOZIS has 
operated about six Islamic cooperative loans (BM- Baitul Mal) in some 
regions in West Java such as Yogyakarta (Sleman) and Central Java (Klaten, 
Sukoharjo, dan Karanganyar).50 In recent times, GOZIS has been very 
active to facilitate the campaign of  Abu Rizal Bakrie, the Chairman of  
Golkar, for the upcoming (2014) Presidential Election. In his visit to 
Wonogiri-Central java, Bakrie donated 100 million rupiah (US 10.000), 
claimed as his zakat (almsgiving), to GOZIS of  Wonogiri in order to 
foster ‘Community Development’ in the form of  “revolving funds” in 
the given region. The presence of  Bakrie in Wonogiri was accompanied 
by the Minister of  Maritime Affairs and Fisheries who is also a Golkar 
politician, Sharif  Cicip Sutardjo. Together with Bakrie, Sharif  channeled 
the government grant and aid in the form of  larval and juvenile fish, tree 
seedling, and small-business incentive valuing to hundreds of  millions 
49  Wahid Hasyim was the first and former minister of  Religious Affairs in 
Indonesia, who is also the son of  Hasyim Asy’ari, the co-founder on Nahdlatul Ulama. 
50  During the Ramadhan month in 2012, I attended the soft launching of  BMT 
Gozis in Pasar Butuh, Cangkringan Sleman, an area which was severely devastated by 
the 2010 Merapi Eruption. A number of  political elites from Golkar were present in 
that occasion, such as Fadel Muhammad and Hajriyanto Y. Tohari. 
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rupiah.51 As a counter gift to the patron, the director of  GOZIS in 
Wonogiri publicly declared that 900 of  GOZIS clients, consisting of  
the workers in the informal sector and street-vendors in the traditional 
market are “ready” to support Bakrie in the 2014 presidential election.52
Surprisingly, PDI-P is also involved in the establishment of  
Islamic social foundation. Since its inception, PDI-P appeared as a 
secular-nationalist party. The party’s political ideas are often associated 
with Soekarno’s notions of  nationalism and anti-imperialism. PDI-P 
also claims itself  as a party actively advocating the marginalized groups 
by adopting Soekarno’s concept of  ‘Marhaenisme’. In recent times, the 
term ‘marhanisme’, which is used to mark a pro-poor political ideology, 
has been widely adopted by Soekarno admirers, including the PDI-P’s 
supporters, to show their commitment to the wong cilik (lower class, the 
commoners who are politically subordinated).53 Unlike Golkar which 
seems to be more adaptive to Muslim political aspiration, PDI-P is stick 
to its views to counter any religiously inspired political aspiration. Having 
claimed as representing ‘wong cilik’, PDI-P gained support mainly from 
abangan and religious minority groups. PDI-P also acted as the guardian 
of  nationalism and the state ideology, Pancasila. In Reformasi era, PDI-P 
won the 1999 election and gained significant votes in the 2004 and 2009 
election. 
In post New Order era, the image of  PDI-P as a secular-nationalist 
party has a bit changed. In recent times, PDI-P has utilized Islamic issues 
within the party’s discourse and activities.54 PDI-P’s cordial attitude toward 
Islam is partly marked by the inception of  Baitul Muslimin Indonesia 
(BAMUSI-Home for Indonesian Muslims). BAMUSI was established 
in 2007 by PDI-P politicians to accommodate “Islamic aspiration” or 
more importantly, to change Indonesian Muslims’ perception of  PDI-P. 
51 h t tp ://www.so lopos.com/2013/02/24/datang i -warga-sek i tar 
-wgm-aburizal-bakrie-bagi-bagi-duit-382301.
52  In its road show to East Java, Golkar has also used Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah, 
Pengajian Al-Hidayah, and Satkar Ulama Indonesia to reach constituents among Muslim 
traditionalists.
53  The term wong cilik is used to distinguish ‘the common people’ from wong gedhe 
(the elites) in Javanese tradition. 
54 see http://www.gatra.com/nusantara-1/nasional-1/27145-ultah-keenam,-
bamusi-diminta-luruskan-sejarah-soekarno.html 
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The inception of  BAMUSI received positive praise from the activists of  
Muhammadiyah and NU, as they consider that the presence of  BAMUSI 
will neutralize Muslim perception which tends to confront PDI-P’s 
political stands. From the PDI-P side, the presence of  BAMUSI can also 
facilitate PDI-P to broaden its constituents, especially among Indonesian 
Muslims (santri). BAMUSI promotes the implementation of  Islamic 
values relevant to ‘four pillars’ of  the state: Pancasila (the state ideology), 
UUD 1945 (the State Constitution), NKRI (The Unite of  the Indonesian 
Republic), and Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Ideas of  the “Unity in Diversity”).55 
BAMUSI is chaired by PDI-P politician who is also a professor of  Islamic 
studies at UIN Alauddin Makassar, Hamka Haq. BAMUSI has three 
main objectives. The first is to provide religious guidance for abangan 
grouping in Indonesia. Hamka explains that from 200 million Muslims in 
Indonesia, only half  of  them (known as the “abangan”) have a sufficient 
knowledge about Islam. The second is ideological objective which relates 
to the efforts of  PDI-P to preserve Pancasila as the state ideology by 
exploring Muslim notions of  Islam, nationalism and pluralism. Finally, the 
objective of  BAMUSI is to support Muslim minority groups in certain 
regions to participate in politics.56 In order to accomplish its mission, 
BAMUSI engaged Muhammadiyah and NU to provide human recourses 
adaptive to the PDI-P’s political vision.57 
So far, there has been no specific program set up by BAMUSI 
to collect zakat. But like other political party-based Islamic charities, 
BAMUSI activities are also overwhelmingly characterized by charitable 
services, such as distribution of  aid (bingkisan), organizing Qurban 
festival, religious mass gathering and praying (shalawatan), and celebration 
of  Muslim festival days. In framing their activities, BAMUSI activists 
used the term wong cilik, which in a certain context can be juxtaposed 
55  The term ‘four pillars’ was popularized by Taufik Kiemas, and now is widely 
introduced and disseminated to public by the MPR.
56  See http://www.jpnn.com/index.php?mib=berita.detail&id=113514 
57  It appears that a number of  former youth activists from Muhammadiyah 
and NU become BAMUSI functionaries, and two leading figures in the modernist 
and traditionalist circle, represented by Ahmad Syafii Maarif  (former chairman of  
Muhammadiyah) and Said Agil Siradj (the chairman of  NU) are appointed as the 
members of  BAMUSI Board of  Trustee. The friendship between Taufik Kiemas, a 
senior PDI-P politician, and many Muslim leaders become a key factor in the inception 
of  BAMUSI. 
Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2013 M/1435 H 357
The Politics of  Benevolence
with the Islamic concept of  dhu’afa (the oppressed). The way BAMUSI 
formulated social problems and invented strategies to overcome the 
perceived problems remain conventional, lack of  a development 
perspective, especially if  we compare it with GOZIS whose investments 
in the operation of  BMT are prevailing, or PKPU whose humanitarian 
actions are equipped and supported by professional volunteers. 
Again, as all is about politics, BAMUSI has been faced with a 
political turmoil when the East Java branch of  BAMUSI made political 
maneuvers during the governor election in East Java. The BAMUSI in 
East Java publicly declared that they supported the former president 
of  GP Ansor (NU Youth Association), Saefullah Yusuf, to strengthen 
his candidacy in the election. However, the central board of  BAMUSI 
supported another candidate promoted by PDI-P. This implies that there 
has been a complex political reality to be faced by political parties and 
their charitable associations. The diversity of  political interest among the 
advocates of  the party-autonomous organizations has also contributed to 
the failure of  parties and their charities to concentrate on a social-political 
imaginary to be achieved, such as to promote the welfare of  society. 
D. Conclusion 
This article concerns the myriads ways within which benevolent 
acts are expressed in contemporary Indonesian Muslim political activism. 
The institutional transformation undergone by political parties gives 
us a clear picture of  the political dynamism of  Islamic charities in 
contemporary Indonesia. The inception of  Islamic charities by political 
parties in contemporary Indonesia, in particular, has marked a new trend 
in Indonesian philanthropic activism, and I believe, this trend will increase 
in the near future. This is partly because charitable activities are still 
believed to have become an effective way for politicians to communicate 
with their potential supporters as well as to patronize their constituents. 
However, from the perspective of  development, this paper argues 
that the prevailed patronage between charitable organizations and political 
parties have weakened, instead of  strengthen Muslim framework in 
the promotion of  collective change. As a matter of  fact, patron-client 
bonds between parties and charitable organizations do not result in the 
ability of  Islamic charities to deliver aid effectively to their intended 
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beneficiaries, or to fuel party functionaries to address the roots of  poverty 
problems. Instead of  promoting change through the high level politics, 
many parties fall into the trap of  social services with has little to do with 
their responsibility as agents of  political change. In other words, the 
enduring networks between charities and political parties seem to have 
not functioned effectively to energize the state’s apparatus to sharpen 
their welfare policies. The party-based Islamic charities discussed above 
espouse a wide range of  political goals, and the patronage system has put 
Islamic charities in a weaker position in front of  their political patrons 
(elites). 
The politics of  benevolence has far reaching consequences 
for the future of  charitable organizations, in general, and that of  
democratic political culture in Indonesia, in particular. In an era where 
the state is still considered weak in providing a proper welfare scheme 
for societies, charitable organizations will continue to proliferate. The 
future of  party-based charitable organizations is, therefore, very much 
contingent upon the ability of  charitable organizations to preserve 
their integrity, accountability and professionalism. The case of  PKPU 
is differing from that of  GOZIS and BAMUSI. PKPU has appeared as 
a professional Muslim charitable organization and been equipped with 
professional volunteers. It attempts to detach from, at least publicly, the 
party (PKS). Unsurprisingly, PKPU gained a substantial support from 
public, private companies, and government agencies. In this respect, 
GOZIS and BAMUSI have to unequivocally become professional relief  
and development agencies. GOZIS decision to specialize in micro-
finance project, for example, may determine its future trajectory as an 
autonomous development NGO. Becoming an independent organization 
is imperative for party-based charitable organizations to expand and 
sharpen their framework of  development in Indonesia’s social, political 
and economic setting. 
This study has underlined some consequences of  political 
clientelism to democratic culture in Indonesia. Some of  the political elites 
from PKS, Golkar, and PDIP were, in fact, allegedly involved in illicit 
activities such as corruption, bribes, and gratification. This fact, in turn, 
will decrease people’s loyalty to parties. The complexity of  patron-client 
relationship in Indonesian politics has also put party-based charitable 
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organizations in a delicate situation, whether their objective is to promote 
the public good or simply to patronize their beneficiaries. Studies on 
patron-client relationship in Indonesia have noted that political patronage 
through charity does not automatically strengthen clients’ loyalty to their 
patrons, nor does it significantly increase the numbers of  votes during 
the election.58 Therefore, while the clientelistic political framework does 
not work well in mobilizing mass, this framework also will reduce the 
strength of  charitable organizations in formulating the idea of  the public 
good for the welfare of  citizens.
58  See Hilman Latief, “Islam and Humanitarian Affairs,” 181-182; Hasrul Hanif, 
“Politik Klientelisme Baru dan Dilema Demokratisasi di Indonesia,” Jurnal Sosial & 
Politik (JSP), Volume 12 No.3 (2009), pp. 348-349. 
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